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CONSTITUTIONALISING THE OPEN METHOD OF 
COORDINATION 
WHAT SHOULD THE CONVENTION PROPOSE? 
BY 




ithin the Convention process, the final reports of no less than four separate working 
groups – those on Simplification, Complementary Competences, Economic 
Governance and Social Europe – have come out in favour of including the ‘Open 
Method of Coordination’ (OMC) within the Constitutional Treaty. The relevant sections of these 
reports are attached in an annex. 
The reasons for this relatively broad agreement, as expressed in the various reports, stem from 
widespread recognition of the usefulness, efficiency and flexibility of this new form of national 
policy coordination for dealing jointly with issues of common interest to the member states. 
Several of the reports point out that in addition to the two treaty-based coordination mechanisms 
in employment and economic policy launched during the 1990s, the Lisbon European Council 
authorised the extension of this method to a broad range of other policy domains, such as 
information society, enterprise policy, research and development, education and training, 
combating social exclusion and modernising social protection. Since then, significant OMC 
processes have been developed in a number of these fields, especially social protection 
(inclusion, pensions, health care), while new ones have begun to emerge in other areas such as 
immigration and asylum, as well as industrial policy, youth policy and disability policy. 
Some of the Working Group reports argue that the open method has proved a useful policy 
instrument where ‘no stronger coordination mechanisms exist’, (Economic Governance WG, para 
3), and even advocate its confinement to such circumstances (Social Europe WG, paras 41, 43). 
But in reality, as the Convention Secretariat among others points out in its paper on coordination 
of national policies (WG VI, WD 015, 26 September 2002), OMC-type mechanisms have also 
been used as a complement to Union directives in order to elaborate and update legal standards 
(e.g. industrial waste, occupational health and safety), or as a possible route forward where 
“Member States do not yet want common legislation in a given sphere but nevertheless have the 
political will to make progress together” (as in immigration and asylum policy). This fluid reality 
is recognised to a greater extent in the final report of the WG on Complementary Competences 
(para 5, p. 7) which noted that the Lisbon summit had applied the OMC “to areas of Union 
competence, of supporting measures, as well as areas of Member States’ competence”. 
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The value of the OMC, in our view, lies not simply in its general usefulness, efficiency, and 
flexibility as an instrument of EU policy-making. Because the OMC encourages convergence of 
national objectives, performance and policy approaches rather than specific institutions, rules and 
programmes, this mechanism is particularly well suited to identifying and advancing the common 
concerns and interests of the Member States while simultaneously respecting their autonomy and 
diversity. It is neither strictly a supranational nor an intergovernmental method of governance, 
but one that is genuinely joint and multi-level in its operation. By committing the member states 
to share information, compare themselves to one another and reassess current policies against 
their relative performance, the OMC is also proving to be a valuable tool for promoting 
deliberative problem-solving and cross-national learning across the EU. It is for precisely these 
reasons, we believe, that the OMC has so rapidly become a virtual template for Community 
policy-making in complex, domestically sensitive areas where diversity among the member states 
precludes harmonisation but inaction is politically unacceptable, and where widespread strategic 
uncertainty recommends mutual learning at the national as well as the European level. 
Despite the reasonably broad consensus on including the OMC in the constitutional treaty, 
however, at least two concerns about so doing have also been raised in the various WG reports 
and associated plenary debates. The first, and most general of these, is that constitutionalisation 
of the OMC could lead to rigidification of the procedure, thereby undermining the flexibility that 
is widely agreed to be one of its main advantages. The second and more specific concern is that 
the OMC could be (mis)used as a substitute for existing harder or more powerful legal 
instruments, thereby weakening the member states’ and the EU’s commitment to the standards or 
values that would otherwise be contained in the latter. This is a version of the concern that is 
sometimes expressed to the effect that the spread of soft law might undermine the use of hard 
law, thus not only undermining the specific commitment to particular objectives (such as, for 
example, in the field of social policy) but also more generally undermining the wider European 
integration project that has relied so much over the years on the compelling normative force of 
law. 
These concerns are important and should be addressed in any provision to constitutionalise the 
OMC. However, we believe that they would be better addressed by a provision that articulates 
those concerns more directly, rather than by the cruder and practically unworkable mechanism of 
excluding the use of the OMC in any field where the EU possesses legislative competence (as 
proposed by the Social Europe WG, paras 41, 43). The latter mechanism would undermine the 
possibility of using the OMC, as has already been done in a number of contexts, in a 
complementary manner to flesh out and adapt the content of existing binding legislative 
standards. Secondly, it would exclude the important possibility of using the OMC as a first 
venture into a policy field in which it proves initially impossible to reach political agreement on 
the use of binding legislation, and where an OMC could over time be used to build up consensus 
amongst the states to such an extent that the articulation of stronger legal commitments would 
later become possible. What we advocate, therefore, is some kind of ‘chapeau’ phrase in the 
generic provision anchoring the OMC in the Constitutional Treaty, which specifies that it should 
not be used in a way that would undermine or weaken the existing EU acquis, nor as a permanent 
substitute for Union legislative action permissible under the Constitutional Treaty.  
To address the more general of the two concerns outlined above, i.e. that constitutionalising the 
OMC runs the risk of rigidifying its procedures and thereby restricting the flexibility of its 
application to different policy fields, we support the proposal of the Social Europe WG Report  C ONSTITUTIONALISING THE OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION 
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(para 42) to define only the fundamental characteristics of this method (its aims and basic 
elements) in a generic provision of the Constitutional Treaty. The precise nature of OMC 
procedures could then, as the Working Group Report suggests, be worked out experimentally to 
suit the different issue areas concerned, rather than being specified in detail in the Constitutional 
Treaty, with the exception of the existing treaty-based coordination processes in economic and 
employment policy, which would be embodied in subsequent articles. To preserve the “soft” 
acquis established by the ongoing OMC processes in social inclusion and social protection, while 
leaving ample flexibility for future developments, we also support the proposal to include a 
specific constitutional provision on the application of the method in the social policy field, along 
the lines suggested by Dr. Frank Vandenbroucke, the Belgian Minister of Social Affairs and 
Pensions, to an expert hearing of the Social Europe Working Group on 21 January 2003 (see 
annex) and endorsed by members of the Group in its final report (para. 47). 
A generic provision for incorporating the OMC into the Constitutional Treaty might draw on the 
definition of the method proposed by Louis Michel, the Belgian Foreign Minister, and 
incorporated with some modifications into the Report of the Social Europe Working Group (para. 
37), as a form of policy coordination “consisting for Member States, at their own initiative or at 
the initiative of the Commission, with due respect for national and regional diversity, in setting 
joint objectives and indicators on a given topic, and, on the basis of national reports, enabling 
these states to improve their knowledge, develop exchanges of information, experience and 
practice, and, in accordance with the objectives set, to promote innovative approaches likely to 
result where appropriate in guidelines, recommendations or other forms of European legislation” 
(WG XI, WD 30). Such a generic provision might also, as the Social Europe Working Group 
Report suggests (para 42), properly make reference to the importance within the OMC of 
establishing a timetable for action in advancing common objectives and assessing the ability of 
national actions to achieve those objectives against appropriate outcome indicators.  
In the spirit of flexibility advanced above, however, a generic provision for constitutionalising 
the OMC should not seek to prescribe in detail the respective roles of particular actors in its 
procedures. Hence, it would be inappropriate, for example, to specify that whenever the OMC is 
used, “the Commission would have the power to make recommendations to Member States’ 
governments and to inform national parliaments directly of their opinions” (Social Europe WG 
Report, para 45), especially since the Social Protection Committee has not so far agreed to 
empower the Commission to issue such recommendations within the social inclusion and pension 
reform processes. But it would be important for the generic constitutional provision on the OMC 
to ensure a clear consultative role for the European Parliament. Such consultation is already 
mandated within one of the existing treaty-based policy coordination processes (the European 
Employment Strategy), although not the other (the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines). There 
have been repeated and legitimate calls in recent years for a more generalised consultative role 
for the Parliament, as the EU’s broadly democratically representative organ, within the various 
OMC processes, and a new generic provision should reflect this, without being excessively 
prescriptive. 
A better way of ensuring the “transparency and democratic character” of the OMC, which the 
Report of the Social Europe WG (para 44) rightly deems necessary, would be to include within 
the generic provision of the Constitutional Treaty explicit requirements for transparency and 
broad participation in all OMC processes (including those specified in greater detail in 
subsequent articles). The requirements which should be added are firstly, an obligation to ensure   DE BÚRCA & ZEITLIN 
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that the OMC is conducted as openly as possible in accordance with the principle of 
transparency; and secondly an obligation to ensure the fullest possible participation of all relevant 
bodies and stakeholders, including social partners, civil society organisations, national 
parliaments and local/regional authorities, in accordance with national laws and practices. These 
twin requirements of transparency and broad participation are crucial to both the democratic 
legitimacy and practical effectiveness of the OMC, which is why we strongly recommend their 
inclusion as constitutional obligations (albeit recognising the variety of national laws and 
practices through which such obligations will be given effect), rather than as permissive 
provisions for consultation of various types of actors during the implementation process (as 
proposed by the Social Europe WG Report, para 45; cf. also the recommendation for “widespread 
consultation” in the Economic Governance WG Report, para IV, 3). In particular, we believe that 
participation by the widest possible range of actors in OMC processes at all levels, which 
depends in turn on openness and transparency, is essential in order to ensure the representation of 
diverse perspectives, tap the benefits of local knowledge, and hold public officials accountable 
for carrying out agreed commitments in meeting common Union objectives. Such requirements 
for transparency and broad participation in OMC processes would be in accordance with the 
constitutional views expressed by the Economic and Social Committee (WG XI, WD 40), the 
Committee of the Regions, the European Trade Union Confederation, the Platform of Social 
NGOs (which includes the European Anti-Poverty Network and the European Women’s Lobby), 
and the European Public Social Platform (which includes the Assembly of European Regions, the 
Council of European Municipalities and Regions, and EUROCITIES). They are also consistent 
with the revised common objectives for the social inclusion process adopted by the Council in 
December 2002, with the Commission’s recent Communication on the Future of the European 
Employment Strategy, and with numerous resolutions of the European Parliament. 
 
Our recommendations, therefore, drawing on the suggestions made in the four Working Group 
final reports, but with a number of modifications and additional suggestions, are: 
(1) The OMC should be included in the Constitutional Treaty. The two existing coordination 
processes in employment and economic policy should be retained; a third specific OMC 
provision should be included to cover the social policy field so as to preserve the distinctive 
and valuable OMC acquis that has already developed in social inclusion and social 
protection, along the lines proposed by the Social Europe WG in para 47 of its final report; 
and a flexible generic enabling OMC provision should be introduced for areas other than 
these three, along the lines proposed by the Social Europe WG in section IV of its final 
report, but subject to the further recommendations that we make below regarding 
transparency and participation. 
(2) The generic provision should not restrict the availability of the OMC to areas where the EU 
does not possess legislative competence; nor to areas where the Union has only minimum 
harmonising powers. It should specify in general terms, however, that the OMC should not be 
used in a way that would undermine or weaken the existing EU acquis, nor as a permanent 
substitute for Union legislative action permissible under the Constitutional Treaty. 
(3) The generic provision should include an obligation to ensure that all OMC processes are 
conducted as openly as possible in accordance with the principle of transparency; and an  C ONSTITUTIONALISING THE OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION 
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obligation to ensure the fullest possible participation of all of the relevant bodies and 
stakeholders, including social partners, civil society organisations, national parliaments, and 
local/regional authorities, in accordance with national laws and practices. 
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ANNEX 
EXTRACTS ON THE OMC FROM THE WORKING GROUP FINAL 
REPORTS AND EXPERT PROPOSAL FROM 
DR. FRANK VANDENBROUCKE 
 
1. Views/Recommendations of the Social Policy Working Group Final Report 
(CONV 516/1/03) 
37. The open method of coordination was established by the European Council held in Lisbon on 
23 and 24 March 2000. It is a new form of coordination of national policies consisting of the 
Member States, at their own initiative or at the initiative of the Commission, defining 
collectively, within the respect of national and regional diversities, objectives and indicators in a 
specific area, and allowing those Member States, on the basis of national reports, to improve their 
knowledge, to develop exchanges of information, views, expertise and practices, and to promote, 
further to agreed objectives, innovative approaches which could possibly lead to guidelines or 
recommendations.  
38. In Lisbon, the European Council extended the method incorporated in the Title on 
Employment of the TEC to other areas, such as the information society and research policy, 
enterprise policy, education and vocational training policy, combating social exclusion and social 
protection.  
39. An empirical approach has been used to develop and adapt this method to the specific 
characteristics of each field of action. The method is therefore applied in different ways to 
different areas, with an ad hoc procedure being worked out each time. That is why we sometimes 
speak of open methods of coordination, in the plural.  
40. The Group welcomed the usefulness and efficiency of the method, which enables  
Member States to create synergies within the Union in order to deal with matters of common 
interest together. 
41. Although some members expressed doubts, most members requested the insertion into the 
Treaty of a horizontal provision defining the open method of coordination and its procedure, and 
specifying that the method can be applied only where no Union legislative competence is 
enshrined in the Treaty and in areas other than those where the coordination of national policies 
is governed by a special provision of the Treaty defining such coordination (in economic matters 
(Article 99) and in the area of employment (Article 128), in particular). Indeed, unlike the open 
method of coordination, the coordination procedures enshrined in the Treaty are compulsory and 
enable the Union institutions to make recommendations to Member States and even to impose 
sanctions on Member States which do not respect the line jointly adopted. The open method of 
coordination could nevertheless be applied to areas where coordination of national policies is 
provided for in the Treaty, but where the detailed arrangements are not laid down, such as trans-
European networks (Article 155 TEC), enterprise policy (Article 157 TEC) and research and 
technological development (Article 165 TEC).  C ONSTITUTIONALISING THE OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION 
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42. The Treaty provision on the open method of coordination should be embodied in the 
Constitutional Treaty, within the Chapter on Union instruments which constitute non-legislative 
measures. This provision should define the aims of the open method of coordination and the basic 
elements to be applied. These would include the identification of common objectives, 
establishing a timetable for action as well as, where appropriate, outcome indicators making it 
possible to assess whether national actions are able to achieve the objectives, and facilitating 
exchanges of experience between Member States. The precise nature of any Open Method of 
Coordination procedure would be guided by the nature of the issue involved, rather than be 
specified in detail in the Treaty.  
43. At the same time, the scope and limits of the method would need to be specified by indicating 
that the open method of coordination is an instrument for achieving the Union's objectives; that 
the instrument can be implemented only where the Union does not have legislative competence, 
and where Union competence in the area of sectoral coordination is not enshrined in the Treaty 
(Articles 99, 104 and 128) or where the Union has competence only for defining minimum rules, 
in order to go beyond these rules. The open method of coordination constitutes an instrument 
which supplements legislative action by the Union, but which can under no circumstances replace 
it. It enables the Union to support and supplement Member States' actions. 
44. While allowing for the flexibility of the instrument to be retained, incorporation of the open 
method of coordination in the Treaty would improve its transparency and democratic character, 
and clarify its procedure by designating the actors and their respective roles. 
45. The method would in principle be implemented each time by a decision of the Member States 
meeting within the Council on the basis of the Conclusions of the European Council on the 
initiative of the European Commission , with notification of the European Parliament. National 
parliaments and regional or local authorities could be consulted during implementation, as could 
the social partners when the open method of coordination is applied to the social field. Civil 
society could possibly be consulted when the matter under coordination lends itself to that. The 
Commission would be responsible for analysing and evaluating the action plans. The outcome of 
the Commission's analysis could be discussed within the European Parliament and national 
parliaments. The Commission would have the power to make recommendations to Member 
States' governments and to inform national parliaments directly of their opinions in order to 
trigger a "peer review" procedure and to a national debate, the aim being to allow Member States, 
within the Union framework, to set themselves common objectives while retaining national 
flexibility in their implementation. 
46. Although some members of the Working Group wished to include into the Constitutional 
Treaty not only the method, but also the list of subjects to which the open method of coordination 
could be applied, a consensus emerged against such a list. 
47. Some areas to which the method could be applied were mentioned in the Group, such as 
education, tax harmonisation and the establishment of minimum social standards. Members of the 
Group thought social protection and inclusion was particularly well suited to this approach, and 
considered that a specific reference as to how the open method could be applied in this case could 
be inserted into the Constitution, building on the description of the role and functioning of the 
Social Protection Committee (as established under article 144 of the Nice Treaty). 
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2. Views expressed in the Final Report of the Working Group on 
Complementary Competences (CONV 375/1/02) 
Some members of the working group requested that the Open Method of Coordination be 
codified in the Treaty as an additional instrument for the Union. They defined the method as “a 
mutual feedback process of planning, examination, comparison and adjustment of the (social) 
policies of (EU) Member States, all of this on the basis of common objectives”. The working 
group noted that the Open Method of Coordination, as instituted by the European Council in 
Lisbon, March 2000, applies to areas of Union competence, of supporting measures as well as 
areas of Member States’ competence. Broad agreement was found in the group to ask the 
working group on simplification (WG IX) to include the instrument of Open Method of 
Coordination in its work as a “soft” instrument or method. 
3. Views expressed in the Final Report of the Working Group on Economic 
Governance (CONV 357/02) 
The Working Group considers that the open method of coordination has proved to be a useful 
instrument in policy areas where no stronger coordination instruments exist. There is a large 
measure of support within the Group for including, for the sake of clarity, the basic objectives, 
procedures and limits of the open coordination method, where the European Parliament and the 
European Commission should also have a role to play, in the Constitutional Treaty, but in a 
manner which does not undermine the flexibility of the method (which is one of its main 
advantages) and which does not have the effect of replacing or circumventing 'Community' 
procedures or policies. It is recommended that it should include a provision allowing for a wide-
ranging consultation process, in particular with the social partners. However some members of 
the Group consider that the informal character of the open coordination method should be better 
preserved by keeping it outside the Treaty. 
4. Views expressed in the Final Report of the Working Group on 
Simplification (CONV 424/02) 
Constitutional status should be assigned to the open method of coordination, which involves 
concerted action by the Member States outside the competences attributed to the Union by the 
treaties. It should be emphasised that this should not be confused with the coordination 
competences conferred upon the Union by various legal bases, notably in the economic and 
employment fields. 
5. Proposal by Dr. Frank Vandenbroucke, Belgian Minister of Social Affairs 
and Pensions, for anchoring the open method of coordination with regard to 
social protection and inclusion to the Treaty 
In the fields referred to in Articles 137, paragraph 1, (j) and (k), (*) 
the Council, 
on the basis of the conclusions of the European Council,  C ONSTITUTIONALISING THE OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION 
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pursuant to a consensus between the Member States, on a proposal from the Commission, which 
takes into account the opinion of the Social Protection Committee, and after consulting the 
European Parliament, management and labour, and the Social Protection Committee, 
shall 
- adopt a set of commonly agreed objectives and commonly agreed indicators, 
- if appropriate, draw up guidelines which the Member States shall take into account in their 
policy, 
- adopt reports on the implementation of this co-operation process. 
The result of this process shall be incorporated into the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines. 
(*) Reference is to the Treaty establishing the European Community as amended by the Treaty of 
Nice). 